Burma is one country with zero democracy. In the light
of the bloody crackdown against peaceful protesters
there, to recounts the rise of the brutal military
regime and how it morphed into a brutal dictatorship.

After World Wars I and II, the Burmese people realised
that state security from sudden invasion by the then
imperialist powers such as the Japanese and Germans
was not guaranteed. At that time, the role of the
military was to fight the invading enemy, to protect
the people and the country. This did not mean that the
military’s primary objective was to rule the state.
Military rule should be the exception - only during
emergency situations.

According to Alagappa, “the military’s primary role is
deemed to be in [the] international arena”. The
people’s voice should be supreme for nation building
in this day and age. The military’s role in the
international arena only arises when world war or
other global conflicts occur. This is when the country
is faced with an external threat. The state’s police
force is seen as sufficient for handling crime and
maintaining internal security.

Moreover, the state should be accountable for any
militarised action it takes. It should be with the
consent of the people or there should be provisions in
the Constitution to authorise such action.

Here ‘civilian rule’ refers to the state, political
society, and civil society, especially the political,
administration, and juridicial institutions. In
civilian rule, the military is not involved in ruling
the country. This article looks at how the military
developed in Burma and finally took over the country.

Achieving a shaky independence

In Asia, many modern day sovereign nations are
ex-colonies of former colonial powers. Even after
gaining independence, many of them had not achieved
sufficient political maturity to build the state
themselves. This resulted in the potential collapse of
the state as weaknesses were found in several sectors.
Occasionally the military interfered in the civilian
rule and politics of the state. Under military rule,
however, different levels of state building and ruling
systems were developed in the newly independent
nations in Asia.

Military domination in North Korea, Pakistan and Burma
clearly shows how the political process, national
goals and agenda have been determined by the military.
The state is directly run by the military, although a
different name such as council or committee may be
used for the governing body. But the military are in
full control of the State in those countries.

Formation of the Burmese army

The Union of Burma had a basic civil constitution in
1947 (reflecting the Penglong Agreement), as well as
its agreement with the different ethnic nationalities
for the first time as a step towards nation building.
This was of common interest to all the people and an
acceptable basic principle for the formation of a
nation. The Penglong Agreement also paved the way to
achieving Burmese independence from the British. It
was a historic event as the different ethnic
nationalities united to defend Burma from the threat
of a colonising invasion. It was founded on state
civil-military relations from the founding moment:
independence from colonial rule in 1948.

In Burma the armed forces were originally organised as
a federation of ethnically constituted regiments
established during the colonial period such as the
Chin and Kachin regiments. It also saw the involvement
of different ethnic nationalities fighting for
independence from colonisation. Apart from this,
ethnic regiments significantly contributed to
defending the federal union of Burma during the civil
war in the early years.

But the sincere comradeship of the multi-ethnic
regiments was destroyed after Independence was
achieved. The reason is that, immediately after
Independence, the Burmese Independence Army (BIA) was
formed by only the prominent Burman nationalist
politicians who had participated in Japan’s invasion
of Burma in 1942.

Subsequently, within a few months of Independence in
1948 it was reorganised by force “with Burman (refers
to ‘proper Burma’ as well as known ‘lower Burma’
mainly from the central part of the country, not Chin,
Kachin, Shan, Karenni, Karen, Mon or Arakan ethnic
group) officers and men dominating all units,
regardless of their ethnic names” (Silverstein 1990).
The ethnic regiments were excluded and placed in
different units and so were fragmented.

Hence, it was a total assault on the federal army,
national freedom and independence, unity and loyalty
of the ethnic groups. The federal army was abolished.
The army comprises Burman extremists who have betrayed
the ethnic nationalities.

Moreover, the new army started claiming a hold on the
nation touting itself its guide. This was not at all
fair as the new army only served the interests of
Burman extremist leaders. This was the beginning of
how the Burmese army became the federal broker and
national ethnic unity broker in contravention of the
1947 constitution. It is clearly a military insult to
the nation after the secret arrest and disappearance
of the Federal Union’s constitutionally appointed
former president and Chairman of the chamber of
nationalities S. Shwe Thaik in 1962. (An ethnic Shan,
he became the president of the Union of Burma on 4
January 1948 at its independence. He served as the
head of state of Burma between 1948 and 1952. After
this term as president, he was the chairman of the
chamber of nationalities until 1962. In the military
coup of March 1962 he was arrested by military head
General Ne Win and died in prison in November 1962.)
Similarly, the father of Independence, General Aung
San, was assassinated in 1947 by Burman extremists.

Since then, the armed forces have been almost
permanently at war with the Karen, Shan and other
ethnic minorities. The government has failed to
incorporate these minorities into the national
community. Ethnic rebel groups increase in numbers on
the periphery of Burma.

At the height of conflict in 1949-50 the military was
elevated to partnership in the government. It was
called in again by the politicians to form a caretaker
government and hold the country together in 1958 and
subsequently took power; the constitution was
allegedly terminated in the 1962 coup (Luckham).

This coup arose in connection with civilian rule due
to alleged intrigue by the Burman extremist patriotic
group. It led to a mis-driven economic budget
utilisation, which failed to implement the policy
reforms required that might have transformed the
economy. The military coup in 1962 occurred with the
cooperation of the Burman dominated army. To date,
this army remains Burma’s national army, known as
“Myanmar Thatmadaw”.

Nation's guardian or oppressor?

Now the role of the army is more than guardian of the
nation; it is a full participant in government. The
army has paved the way to dictatorship instead of
maintaining and rebuilding the nation. Its failure to
maintain parallel economies and political institutions
– have reinforced the stagnation of the economy and
the repressiveness of the military regime (Luckham).

The Burmese military government attempted to outflank
the left by establishing its own Burma Socialist
Programme Party (BSPP); the new military order was an
autarkic and non-aligned socialist state. The reason
for becoming Socialist was to create a political
ideological balance between the neighboring countries.
Burma was treated as a strategic buffer between the
democratic Indian and the communist Chinese regimes on
its borders (Luckham).

For various reasons, the Burmese army took power not
only to solve the crisis but also to form its own
party, the BSPP. Army chief, General Ne Win, became
Burma’s Socialist Party president. The prolonged and
continuing domination by the military clearly seems to
be aimed at perpetuating military rule through the
creation of a single-party structure. Since then,
Burma’s democracy has been totally confiscated and the
country has never returned to civilian rule.

The Burmese Army started the repression of the
students’ and workers’ demonstrations in the 1960s and
1970s; these were brutally crushed. It even resorted
to torture, and the economy steadily deteriorated. By
mid-1988, rice shortages and popular discontent
reached crisis proportions. The police slaying of a
student sparked demonstrations.

Coinciding with the fall of the communist strong hold
of Soviet Russia, which was also Burma’s ally, General
Ne Win, Burma’s socialist dictator, in fear of mass
demonstrations, resigned as head of the government in
July 1988. Sein Lwin, his own armyman, replaced him
as the new president. But the strongman Sein Lwin was
forced by public fury to quit on 12 Aug after only 18
days in power. There was a nation wide strike and
thousands were killed by the army.

The main thing that the people demanded was a change
in political structure. The people did not demand a
mere change of BSPP leadership. But the military
group didn’t want to end the BSPP, and kept on
changing the leadership of the party making General
Maung Maung the next leader. Later, by the continuous
demand of the people, and failed repressive measures
to crush it, the BSPP’s hold on power was finally
ended.

Then, in September 1988, through reassertion of their
power in the country, the army formed the State Law
and Order Restoration Council (SLORC); senior general
Saw Maung became chairman of SLORC. On 18 September
1988, the military took power again with the new name
(SLORC) after killing a sufficient number of people.
At the same time, the military made a verbal promise
for “democracy” just to pacify the people.

However, the SLORC military government again abolished
the second constitution of 1974; even though that 1974
constitution was not democratic, the new SLORC issued
martial law decrees that forbade any public criticism
of the military and prohibited public gatherings of
more than five people. On the same date SLORC took
power, the military regime announced that they would
implement a multi-party democratic system in Burma.

It looked like the army had finally responded to calls
for democracy by announcing a coup by SLORC. But this
announcement turned out to be merely idealistic
rhetoric, as people later realised, because SLORC did
not transfer power to the elected party.

In June 1989, SLORC changed the name of the country to
Myanmar; in 1992, senior general Saw Maung, who took
control of the state by force in 1988, retired.
Another general, Than Shwe, then became the
chairperson of SLORC and has ruled till today. Than
Shwe renamed the party the State Peace and Development
Council in November 1997.

Recent massacre

The current Burmese public demonstration that began in
September is not just an ethnic confrontation with the
military government; but the majority of Burman people
also participated in the demonstration. They realised
it was not only about ethnic conflicts but also an
issue for the whole nation, and that the military
caused misunderstanding amongst ethnic communities of
different religions. That is why a big internal
revolution was raised recently in Burma mainly led by
the monks.

The monks, particularly, feel a huge burden because of
military misuse of Buddhism against other ethnic
minority religions. On 24 September 2007 alone, over a
million people took to the streets in 26 cities and
towns, including all the ethnic states across Burma,
marching for freedom and human rights (Asia Pacific
People’s Partnership on Burma (APPPB) Maroon
Revolution in Numbers).

However, as was characteristic of the military junta,
despite claiming to be Buddhists and Burman
nationalists, they brutally killed the monks in the
recent September massacre. The army didn’t even
respect the Buddhist ‘god’ by not taking off their
shoes in the temple and pagoda, against their own
Buddhist tradition, and went in to kill Buddhist
monks.

According to the Assistance Association for Political
Prisoners (AAPP), at least 4,000 people including more
than 1,000 monks were arrested. At least two national
United Nations staff have been arrested and detained.
Around 300 people were killed including one Japanese
journalist and possibly thousands of people as well.
Not less than 1,000 people have disappeared in this
Revolution. Possibly ten thousand people were
arrested. Even before 21 August 2007, there were 1,158
political prisoners already in prisons. Three thousand
students were shot in 1988 and numbers of people
massacred in 2003 at Depayin.

Moreover the public feared further prolonging of
military power in Burma as the newly drafted
constitution stipulates “25 per cent directly reserve
seats for military in parliament”. This is dangerous
for all Burmese people. Public participation was very
limited in drafting the constitution, and there were
no fundamental rights of freedom of ex-pression and the
right to assembly. It can lead to wrong nation
building that could have adverse implications for
Burma’s future.

Burma has a serious ruling structure problem. The
military government is a cruel illegal ruler , which
is still trying to hold on to power.

This is how the Burmese military junta, which was
supposed to be the nation’s guidance in early times,
later turned into a dictatorship, killing its own
people till today. Moreover, the Burmese military has
a deep-rooted tradition of dictatorship; it cannot
commit to genuinely building a democratic nation as
long as power is in the hands of the army.

Democracy versus military rule

The possibility exists for the military to take
temporary control when a civilian government strays
from its ‘national ideal’ or obligation. In Burma’s
case, if the military was the genuine guardian it
should have solved the civilian conflict among the
various ethnic nationalities. For example, there was a
democracy dilemma in civilian rule in early 1950 to
1960: civilian rulers from the Burman extremists group
tried to dominate the country by secret
Buddishtisation and Burmanisation over other ethnic
nationalities (Horton, Guy 2005). The Prime Minister U
Nu himself was presumably involved in these efforts.
(U Nu also attempted to legalize Buddhism as the state
religion in 1961.) This is the consequence of
extremist Burmanisation and a weak democracy.

It certainly violates the nation’s constitution as
well as the fundamental Penglong Agreement, by
discrimination and restriction of freedom. Society’s
support of this fundamentalist and pro-domination
trend is always a problem for nation building. It
apparently led to the failure of civilian rule. In
such an event, the intervention of the military is
appropriate to prevent extremists taking power. But
here the military also became the partner of extremist
Burmans. We later realised they were linked with each
other.

Slowly, we discovered that the military initially,
immediately reorganised the army and later held a coup
to form the Socialist party, with the purpose of
monopolising military power and controlling the
country. Looking back, the behaviour of the Burmese
military was not about creating a resolution for
democracy, but rather about having lasting political
power and control of the country.

When conflicts between the Burman dominant group and
other ethnic groups arise, within the system of
civilian rule, the army should protect and be
responsible for their reunification instead of aiding
the ethnic-cleansing of the other ethnic groups. The
army should play an impartial role.

According to Enloe (1981), a second society-based
explanation of military politicisation and
intervention is that the military intervenes to
protect and advance the interests of a specific class
or ethnic/religious group (Alagappa 48). But in the
case of Burma the military is systematically
maintaining power itself to control the civilian
population. This is one of the reasons the BIA
(military name of early time) allegedly removed from
the federal army ethnic regiments like the Chin and
Kachin Regiments. The military was also hand-in-hand
with the Burman extremists helping to exploit and
collapse other ethnic societies. This is another
regrettable mistake in the Burmese Army’s history.

The military seemed to try to re-assume democracy in
the 27 May 1990 election. But out of 485
parliamentary seats contested; the NLD won 392 (over
80%; 82%). Ethnic minority parties won 65 more seats.
The army-front NUP won only 10 constituencies; it was
clear that people did not approve of the army being in
power. The result was not the one expected by the
military.

However, the urgent question is whether the military
will hand over power to a civilian government or
whether the Burmese military junta will retain power
forever. The military has tasted power for a long
period; so until there is serious or any damaging
opposition armed attack, their attitude is unlikely to
change.

In our latest experience, a non-violent method is
totally opposed to the Burma military. The military
has cheated the public. This is a trap for the
Burmese people as the military always blocks efforts
to obtain civilian rule. The Burmese people have lost
the opportunity of having a civilian administration
and their liberty, for more than half a century.

In a democracy, a civilian government should control
the army. But it appears that the Burmese army never
wants to be under civilian control. Civilian supremacy
is “government control of the military,” and the
criterion for civilian control is “the extent to which
military leadership groups, and through them the armed
forces as a whole, respond to the direction of the
civilian leaders of the government” (Alagappa).

Furthermore, in a democratic system, the concern is to
ensure a professional and political military that
acknowledges civilian authority and executes the
orders of a democratically elected government.

Conclusion

After various studies of the military, it is not
possible for a military that was always linked to
dictatorship or quasi dictatorship to produce
democracy. Therefore, the military should totally
relinquish power and transfer it to a civilian
government. Today, the Burman and other ethnic groups
are mature enough to build the nation.

However, Burma is one of the countries in Asia
dominated by a very hard-line military. The military
has become the supreme power overriding civilian
supremacy. Indeed, it clearly expresses its intention
not to develop democracy. It is right to say that the
present Burmese military government is an illegal
government.

Since 1988, the caretaker military administration
remains in place, rules by martial law, has imprisoned
politicians, and refuses to hand over power to an
elected government (Luckham 32). Furthermore, the
newly drafted constitution has allegedly betrayed the
public by giving weight to military power and again
the holding of elections remains uncertain.

The reason for the existence of a military government
in Burma is neither an emergency nor for a temporary
term. They intend to prolong their rule permanently.
So their action is not limited to a nationalistic
ideal or security matter. Moreover, there is no
threat of any external invasion in Burma. Rather, the
Burmese military has become a threat to neighbouring
countries through unnecessarily increasing its troop
numbers to 400,000, with an additional, 200,000
auxiliary soldiers.