In light of some recent news, I’ve found myself intrigued by
the idea and effectiveness of sanctions on a nation. In his speech today
(September 25) to the U.N. General Assembly, Bush called for tighter sanctions
on Myanmar (also known as Burma). Bush
denounced the human rights abuses perpetrated by the repressive government of Myanmar, and
called for economic sanctions to be tightened. France’s
President Nicolas Sarkozy will visit the U.N. General Assembly next week, and
has said that he will ask for tighter sanctions on Iran. France
has been outspoken about wanting to halt Iran’s
uranium enrichment program, which they fear could lead to a nuclear weapon for Iran.
Despite these urges for economic sanctions from world
leaders, it seems as though they haven’t produced their intended results. Myanmar, while
it is hopefully entering a phase of political change right now, has been under
an extremely oppressive government for decades now. Iran
is a constant source of concern in the international political field, and Iran’s
President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has been stubbornly pursuing his uranium
enrichment program in the face of international scorn and sanctions. Perhaps
the increased weight of reinvigorated sanctions might provide a turning point
in either one of these countries, but it seems to be a long and uncertain
process. Long standing sanctions on Cuba
have failed to really isolate Castro, and sanctions on Saddam Hussein didn’t
help in staving off the U.S.
invasion (which is another matter entirely).
In looking the tactic database on this website, I came
across “Creating Human Rights Awareness through Economic Assistance” tactic organized
by the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC). The tactic can be found
through a keyword search on the new tactics site, or by going under “resources
and tools” and looking under the “Tactics Database” listings.
Here’s a summary of the tactic: “The Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee (BRAC) offers The Micro Enterprise Lending and Assistance
(MELA) program, which helps those who have progressed from poverty to relative
prosperity but are unable to receive loans from formal lending institutions.
Its uniqueness stems from their policy requiring lenders to adhere to child
labor standards, thereby encouraging human rights through lending.”
While the intended audiences are different in nature; it
seems as though this type of positive, reward oriented micro-lending for
smaller communities and individuals has been very successful, while sanctions
against larger countries has yielded patchy results at best. While a foreign
aid versus sanctions debate is a whole different animal than micro-lending
programs, it begs the question of approach. Is there something to be said for a
theory of pre-emptive aid instead of
pre-emptive strike?
Also, who, in a given country, is really affected by the
implementation of sanctions? I’m sure this is a question that will always
depend on a specific country and be a matter of opinion, but in many cases it
seems as though the everyday citizen and member of the public feels the weight
of international sanctions more heavily than their oppressive government.
Programs on a par with BRAC’s micro lending allow direct contact with
individual citizens, improve their quality of life, and as the tactic shows,
encourages adherence to specific human rights norms.
So, is there a possibility for more individual or reward
based approaches in countries where the government is at odds with
international communities? Could micro-lending programs encourage the growing
emphasis on economic and social rights? Is there a way for a program like
BRAC’s to be implemented in a way that affects the decisions of a country’s
government?
Any insight people would like to share is appreciated. Maybe
these things have been around historically but in different forms; or maybe
sanctions are more effective than I realize? I don’t know, so share your
thoughts!






Push and Pull tactics
Thank you for this very insightful and thoughtful reflection on "push / pull" kinds of tactics. The sanctions represent a "push" or stick / punishment tactic and the microlending a "pull" or carrot / incentive tactic. Change can move more rapidly when both can be employed. Though it is difficult for one organization to successfully employ both at the same time. That's the beauty of developing alliances, coalitions and partners.
I've found it interesting that a cash award incentive tactic has emerged from a businessman in Sudan wanting to reward African leaders who model good leadership - with transparency, democratic processes, anti-corruption mechanisms, and turn over power peacefully to an elected successor. The businessman apparently hopes to provide a large cash amount to deter leaders from their desire to remain in power and siphon money for their own benefit from the public coffers.
There was a recent article posted by the BBC about it.
"The Mo Ibrahim Foundation is next month due to award over $5m to a former African head of state who is judged to have demonstrated exemplary leadership. The presidential prize is also aimed at encouraging best practice."
"...one keen observer of the African scene said granting such a large sum of money to an individual was 'scandalous' and that all of it should go to causes like ending poverty on the continent.
Others said the prize had to be substantial to have any realistic prospect of actually encouraging good governance while in office - and that the $5m would spark a valuable debate in civil society about what it means to run a country well."
To read more go here: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7010846.stm
Micro/Macro
Very interesting article! I don't know a lot of actual examples, but here's what made theoretical sense to me:
When governments refuse to support human rights, NGOs need innovative methods like these. Microlending or other micro-aid as a reward for following human rights standards sounds like a much more effective method than punitive "macro"-sanctions. I have frequently heard the argument that sanctions can harm innocent citizens as much as their oppressive governments.
However, as you mentioned, "micro" strategies work best for long-term preemption. They can promote more ethical practices in general, but in short-term crises like the one in Myanmar "micro" methods will have little impact and be impossible to carry out. Short-term crises are where "macro" methods theoretically should work. And perhaps they do.
Mo Ibrahim's program is intriguing because it is on the "macro" level (targeting the leader) but it is a reward, not a punishment. This makes me wonder what a punitive "micro" program might look like. Perhaps merely warning the community that so-and-so is using inhumane practices.
Clearly aid is preferable to punishment and preemption is preferable to crises. Thus, micro-aid is really an ideal method.
Punitive "micro" tactics
Your points are spot on about the current need for "macro" sanctions. The crisis in Mayanmar calls for tactics that will at the very least interrupt the crackdown and stop violations resulting from the crackdown. I think this is what the UN special envoy was trying to do.
I wanted to offer some ideas on your question of punitive "micro" tactics. There are some good examples of punitive "micro" tactics. For example, in the New Tactics tactics database, you can find these two different examples:
From the Center for Justice and Accountability. "CJA helps victims of torture by using United States Federal Laws to bring civil charges against their torturers, regardless of country in which the torture took place. In the summer of 2002, a Florida jury awarded $54.6 million to three Salvadoran survivors who were tortured by Salvadoran security forces between 1979 and 1983. These three individuals sued the generals who commanded the soldiers that tortured them, applying the doctrine of Command Responsibility, where a foreign commander is held liable for the actions of his troops." Since 2002, CJA has won numerous cases against torturers. This tactic seeks to identify and punish specific people with the intention of attacking impunity.
From HIJOS: "In Argentina, perpetrators of abuse during Argentina's dictatorship (1976-1983) often live anonymously among their neighbors, enjoying the immunity granted by the current Argentinean government. HIJOS, a local human rights organization, is trying to unmask this anonymity. To accomplish their goal, they organize a neighborhood-wide information campaign about the crimes of the abuser in their midst. Then they pick a day to demonstrate, using speeches, skits and music as they march toward the home of the abuser. After many demonstrations, the abuser has been socially ostracized. In some cases, the abusers have been forced to move from their neighborhoods."
Targeted "micro" sactions have also been carried out by the US and other governments toward top level leaders AND their family members in particular countries from obtaining tourist/vistor and student visas to limit benefits and movement outside their home country.
On another legal front, the Italian government issued a kind of targeted punitive tactic toward the US governments' extraordinary rendition program. Unable to shut down the whole program, the Italian judiciary instead issued arrest warrants toward identified CIA operatives involved in the kidnapping of a victim in Italy. These operatives can no longer enter any European Union country without being subject to arrest.
Nancy Pearson, New Tactics Program Manager