Comisión Nacional Pro- Referéndum (CNR)
organized a referendum in Uruguay so that the public could vote on the
congressional decision to grant impunity to human rights abusers
employed by the military. Nearly every Uruguayan was affected by human
rights abuses during the brutal dictatorship from 1973 to 1984. During
that time many political dissidents were watched, tortured, and killed.
The military and police detained 55,000 people (1 in 50 of the total
population) and 300,000 people went into exile either out of fear or a
because of the rapidly deteriorating economy.
Though democratic reforms came in 1984, the legacy of Uruguay’s violent
political past was never confronted through legislation. In 1986,
Uruguay’s nascent democracy decided to ignore that legacy altogether:
they refused to allow judicial investigations into crimes committed by
the military during the dictatorship by granting impunity to all agents
of the military.
CNR sought to exercise the constitutional right to hold a popular
referendum on this law. In order to petition the government to hold a
popular referendum, CNR needed to collect 25% of the population’s
signatures within one year after the law passed. This amounted to
nearly 600,000 signatures.
Gathering one quarter of the population’s signatures required
tremendous organizational skills, as well as extensive volunteer
involvement. Some volunteers came from political parties, many more
came from student groups and trade unions, but the most support came
from women’s movements. Note that this is a country where women were
disenfranchised politically- at the time there was not a single woman
in Uruguay’s congress.
Organizing the movement’s participants posed a significant challenge.
For example during a daylong National Campaign to gather signatures,
organizers coordinated the efforts of 9000 brigadistas or volunteer
signature collectors. These kind of massive undertakings, the work of
the movement, wouldn’t have been feasible without computers and
spreadsheets used to tabulate the signatures.
The government and media establishment opposed the organizers from the
beginning. The Uruguayan television networks and newspapers ignored the
entirety of the signature collection process. Despite this obstacle CNR
gathered more than required amount of signatures. After 634,702
signatures were collected and submitted to the government, CNR fought
with the Electoral Review committee over the validity of the
signatures. Signatures supporting the referendum were being rejected,
for what many considered unfair reasons. To most of the organizers and
supporters the validity of the Electoral Review and the democratic
reforms required a fair review. Unlike the signature collection
process, the battle over admitting the signatures was fought in public-
this time with heavy opposition from the media. CNR was given an
ultimatum: it needed to verify thousands of signatures in order for the
referendum to be held. In the end, CNR worked to validate another
10,000 signatures.
The difficulties did not end with the setting of the referendum. The
heavy opposition in the media continued. In fact, parties in favor of
impunity received more than three times as much coverage in the media.
In response CNR focused all their energies on grassroots organizing--
they held rallies, distributed leaflets, hung banners, made posters,
held music festivals, bike marathons and the like.
The referendum was held, turnout was high, and 51% of the voters chose
to uphold impunity. That night CNR issued a press release saying the
accepted the results. The next day, the CNR was disbanded.
Although the referendum didn’t pass, CNR’s work had a large impact in
the Uruguayan political scene. 1 in 3 Uruguayans was visited by
brigadistas during the campaign. This is a success in any democratic
country. While this referendum did not pass, eight more popular
referendums have been attempted. CNR’s work created a new tool with
which to shape Uruguayan democracy. The brigadistas and leaders at CNR
have continued to play a role in politics. For example, CNR treasurer
and executive committee member, Tabarao Vasquez, became mayor of
Montevideo.
The idea of holding a general referendum applies to any situation in
which the government opposes popular opinion. However, it requires that
a provision for this referendum procedure exist in the country or
community.
Using a popular referendum to oppose impunity
