THE NEED FOR NEW TACTICS
BY DOUGLAS A. JOHNSON

The modern human rights movement has made enormous strides in the past few decades in the advancement of the human rights ideal and the establishment of specific protections. The movement created new international conventions condemning torture and protecting the rights of women and children and developed an international consensus regarding the definition of legitimate political activities that deserve protection and support. Political prisoners have been protected from harm and many have been freed. And in many nations, sophisticated institutions have been developed to promote adherence — on both domestic and foreign policy levels — to international human rights standards. We cannot overstate how important these accomplishments are or how difficult they were to achieve.

Three tactics, predominantly, led to these advancements: 1) setting international norms that created a body of conventions, treaties and standards; 2) monitoring compliance to these standards; and 3) denouncing or shaming government actions and inaction when the standards were violated. Over the years, the infrastructure and skills these approaches demand have grown dramatically.

It is clear that these tactics have brought about tremendous advances and thus should continue to be supported and pursued. It is equally clear that there are great limits to what we can accomplish in this way and that these approaches are not, in and of themselves, enough to solve seemingly intractable human rights problems.

Consider the problem of torture. There are, for example, more international conventions and standards, more constitutional protections and national legislation against torture than against any other single human rights abuse. There is more monitoring of torture, not only by the infrastructures of treaty bodies, but by national and international nongovernmental organizations. Add to this capacity the creation of over 250 treatment centers for torture survivors around the world, each of which brings medical resources to bear on documenting torture in thousands of victims and elevates the forensic capacity to document torture. Torture is the most documented and denounced of all abuses.

Yet when Amnesty International launched its third international campaign against torture in 2000, it concluded that torture was as widespread then as it was when the organization launched its first global campaign in 1974. In the past decade alone, we have witnessed human rights violations shocking in their scope — in Bosnia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and the more than 150 countries that still perpetrate or allow torture. I must conclude that torture is as pervasive today as it was when Amnesty International began its work. This workbook includes more than 75 stories of tactical innovation — by students, villagers, government commissioners and others who use sophisticated technology or the tools already at hand, building unexpected strategic alliances and learning from unexpected sectors. The New Tactics in Human Rights Project aims to bring these innovators together and inspire others with their approaches, building unexpected strategic alliances and learning from unexpected sectors. The New Tactics in Human Rights Project aims to bring these innovators together and inspire others with their approaches, building unexpected strategic alliances and learning from unexpected sectors.

The Limits of Current Strategy

The persistence of torture represents a significant challenge to the global community. When the three most common tactics of the human rights movement have not significantly reduced the incidence of torture, it is time to take a good look at the limits of current strategy. Some sense of those limits emerges from a process I call “tactical mapping.”

Beginning with the relationship between the torturer and the victim, a group of ten experts on torture diagrammed other relationships in which that fundamental perversion is embedded and which enable the torture to occur. For example, torturers are usually members of a team with strong hierarchical leadership; they may also be part of a particular police station or military unit. We followed these relationships vertically to understand the chain of command that plans, organizes and funds the use of torture. But we also looked at each level horizontally, in order to understand other possible influences and relationships. Police stations, for instance, also have civilians and physicians in attendance; they, in turn, have relationships to the outside world that have some degree of control or influence over them. The initial map developed using this process diagrammed over 400 relationships, from the highly local to those in the international community.

We posited that every relationship on the diagram was a possible place to begin an intervention to interrupt or control the torturer/victim dyad. With the help of the diagram, we mapped the relationships targeted by various tactics and then the logical chain of relationships that they must influence in order to interrupt the dyad (hence the name, the “tactical map”). In doing so, we reached several important conclusions:

1 Most tactics were initiated on the far edges of the diagram, such as on the international level, meaning they had to work their way through many layers of other relationships before they indirectly affected the torturer/victim dyad. We speculated that this weakened or dissipated the force of the action.

2 Rather than brittle and easily disrupted, systems that use torture are often highly complex, allowing the different institutions which benefit from torture’s use to support each other. As one part of the system is attacked, other parts (such as the police structure, the system of prosecutors, the independence of the judiciary) help protect the target and allow it to self-repair. We understood this to mean that the system will not yield to individual tactics. Rather, the system needs to be affected in multiple areas at the same time to create disequilibrium and prevent self-repair. This requires the use of multiple tactics working in conjunction as part of a more comprehensive strategy.

3 Most organizations in the field incorporate a limited number of tactics within their repertoire. Organizations tend to focus on a narrow set of tactics, and rarely cooperate or collaborate on them. Not only does this limit influence to very narrow sectors in a complex, mutually reinforcing system, but each organization is shaping its strategy based on this isolated capacity rather than on what is needed to affect the situation. We do what we can do, not what we need to do. We speculated that more coordination between tactics would make them more effective.

4 So many relationships on the diagram were unaffected or unmoved in any form of current action. Their strengths and concerns were not called forth to action. We speculated that a much wider array of tactics would be needed to engage these potential actors.
I believe these same conclusions hold true in other social and human rights issues. We need to find new ways of working together — and new ways of working — in order to create effective strategies of change. Some current strategies require a macro-framework, in which the limited resources of many are more effectively combined in a unified campaign. This might require what I call a “strategic convergence” — an institution or person with the moral credibility to pull us together in a new working relationship. But others can be initiated by organizations that begin to test new ways of pressuring complex systems and stimulating action by new actors in the social web. This book is part of an overarching project, the New Tactics in Human Rights Project, to develop a dialogue within the human rights community about how that could come about and to broadly illustrate some of the tools at our disposal for more effective action.

An Emerging Idea
The Center for Victims of Torture (CVT) was founded in 1985 as the first comprehensive treatment facility for torture survivors in the United States. From the outset, CVT’s leadership conceived of its work as developing a new tactic of use to the human rights community. As we began to understand what tactics could emerge from our work, we also encouraged the development of other treatment programs for torture survivors. These new institutions created new strategic opportunities for the human rights movement: restoring, for example, leadership stolen by repression, helping communities come to terms with the legacy of fear, and organizing the health care community as a new human rights constituency. In the course of our work we also began to collect stories of other groups and people who were innovating outside the mainstream’s focus.

The New Tactics project was conceived in 1995. Shortly thereafter, CVT convened advisory groups in Turkey to explore the idea of a “best practices” symposium examining tactics used around the world to resolve — or more effectively struggle with — widespread human rights abuses. We wanted to focus on solutions rather than problems and to proceed from the idea that, at least in part, abuses continue because both civil society and government are stymied by a lack of specific examples of what to do. Although we believed that a problem orientation was useful, it was already being done quite well by the mainstream movement; we believed that not enough attention was focused on effective solutions. There was already a lot of attention to the “what” but too little attention on the “how.”

The idea found resonance and respect with a broad sector of leaders in Turkey. In 1997, CVT formed a partnership with two Turkish organizations — Helsinki Citizens Assembly and the Human Rights Centre of the Turkish and Middle Eastern Institute for Public Administration — to develop the New Tactics in Human Rights Project. Systematic research on innovative tactics began in earnest in 1999 with support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. We also established an International Advisory Committee of nine world leaders to provide visibility and political support and a Human Rights Working Group, composed of 21 human rights leaders, to identify promising tactics and contribute to the project’s overall direction.

The Working Group met with members of the Turkish advisory group in 2000 in Istanbul. The former prime minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Kim Campbell, represented the International Advisory Committee and chaired the gathering. The group engaged in discussions on innovative approaches to advancing human rights, modeled cross-training approaches and formulated action plans for the future work of the project.

Individuals who have worked in the human rights field for much of their lives commented on how the ideas and information shared at the meeting helped them think differently about opportunities to engage new people and approach matters from fresh perspectives. We have continued to build on this initial vision by providing tools — including this book and a web page, www.newtactics.org — and by training human rights advocates in tactical innovation and strategic thinking through a series of regional cross-training workshops.

Framework of Our Thinking
Working at CVT over the past sixteen years has taught me that there are important social and political implications in providing treatment to torture survivors. It has reshaped my thinking about the assumed distinctions between preventing torture and caring for survivors. CVT staff have discovered that the care of survivors is about recovering leadership and helping communities overcome the legacy of fear. We’ve found that the metaphor of healing creates safer political space that allows communities to gather, to work and to learn to take risks. Treatment centers like CVT bring new groups, such as educators, health care professionals and policy makers, into human rights work. And from our position as a treatment center we advocate for an end to torture and for policies and laws that will improve the lives of torture victims. Though we didn’t frame it as such, in the early years at least, we were broadening the definition of human rights work and implementing new tactics.

Also framing my thoughts on New Tactics was my role in the international baby food campaign in the 1970s and 1980s. In late 1976 I headed a grassroots activist group working on hunger issues: we had a program budget of $5000 a year, plus my own subsistence salary. A small group of us began working together across the country and created the Infant Formula Action Coalition (INFACT). With those meager resources we launched a boycott against the world’s largest food corporation, Nestlé, to force changes in its marketing of breast milk substitutes. We built a network of 300 American chapters; created a coalition of over 120 national endorsing organizations with over 40 million members; created the first grassroots international boycott, operating in ten countries; formed the first transnational issue network, IBFAN, operating in 67 nations; became one of the first NGOs invited as an equal participant with nations and corporations into a UN meeting and eventually negotiated the first and only corporate marketing code to emerge from the UN; and, after damaging Nestlé’s revenue by about $5 billion, signed a joint agreement with the company to change its marketing practices in alignment with the international code — an agreement that was hailed as “the most important victory in the history of the international consumer movement.”

I am proud of that campaign and of nearly a decade of work. But, like all beginners, we made a few mistakes. I can trace many of those mistakes to my limited knowledge of tactics. For example, I initially confused tactics with strategy. Strategic thinking is really about how you make the best of what’s available to you and since, in my mind, I had only one tactic available to me, this was, perhaps, inevitable. As with so many leaders who emerge at the grassroots level trying to right a wrong, I began at the level of an activity, graduated to thinking about tactics and struggled to understand how to shape strategy, with only limited notions of the tools that were available to me.

As I have had more experience in shaping the strategy of an organization, it has become clearer to me that the more we understand about tactics, the more flexibly we have to set new strategic directions. I am not arguing, then, that tactical thinking or training supersedes strategic thinking, but rather that tactical development enriches strategic thought.
Goals, Strategy and Tactics

While a focus on tactics is essential, it is not an organization’s first priority. An organization must first set broad goals that reflect the values and beliefs of its founders, leaders or members and that incorporate its mission and purposes. These goals must be clear in order to focus planning. An organization will also need to establish intermediate goals that more closely state what it will accomplish over time and that embed a strategic vision of what is feasible to accomplish.

There is nothing mysterious about strategy, though it is often difficult to think strategically. Strategy is not a single decision, but rather a confluence of decisions: the selection of key objectives and appropriate targets, an understanding of needed constituencies and resources and decisions on which tactics to use and when. More than two thousand years ago, Sun Tzu taught that strategy emerges from understanding the adversary (its goals, strategy, strengths and weaknesses), understanding ourselves (our allies, what are our strengths and limits) and understanding the terrain (where a battle will be fought). The adversary’s tactics are a key component to its strategy and knowledge of such tactics aids us in counteracting them. What we can accomplish, including which tactics we know and which we can successfully implement, will affect the formation of our strategy. Tactical thinking is therefore a critical component of strategic thinking.

Tactics is a specific action that one takes within a strategy and a way to organize our resources to effect change in the world. A tactic may be an activity, a system or even an institution in one situation and a technique in another. Tactics will manifest themselves differently depending on the size, capability and resources of the organization. Tactics embody how one goes about making change, while a strategy involves decisions on which tactics to use, which targets deserve focus and which resources can be employed. Our knowledge of tactics also shapes the strategy we choose.

Tactical thinking is essential to an effective struggle for human rights. Let me describe this reasoning in greater detail.

1 What we know how to do influences what we think is possible to do; tactics help determine strategy.

I don’t want to be overly deterministic here. Innovations happen all through human history whenever someone creates a new response to a problem. Nonetheless, human history is full of examples where the same solution is tried over and over again without success, or where a new tactic replaces an old one. Two good examples come from military history: 1) the development of the Greek phalanx, which created a system of fighting that overcame the traditional reliance on disorganized but overwhelming horse warriors, and 2) the incorporation of the long bow into the English armies of Henry V, which overcame the heavily armored knights. Tactical innovation paved the way to new strategic opportunities.

Similarly, when our thinking about how we can act is narrowly defined, we restrict our views of what is possible to accomplish. I rejected a lot of good advice during the baby food campaign because I did not know how to carry out the activities suggested — and couldn’t afford to pay those who did!

2 Different tactics are effective against different targets.

Not all tactics affect all targets equally. Letter-writing campaigns aimed at democratic governments will get a different reaction than the same number of letters to autocratic governments. An economic boycott requires a target concerned with its economic condition and vulnerable in a way that can be touched by the participants.

We must learn to tailor our tactics to our targets, finding those that will have the fullest possible impact. When tactics fail to affect our targets, we must innovate new and more effective tactics.

3 Different tactics appeal to different constituencies.

Each of us has our own learning style. Good teachers recognize this and help us learn by changing their teaching tactics. To engage the broadest range of people in human rights work, we need the same attitude toward social change tactics.

Some people find picketing in front of a torturer’s home a very frightening tactic; others find letter writing too removed from where the change is needed. We can debate who is right or we can recognize that people respond differently to a tactic based on their notions of causation, their tolerance for risk, the time they have available or their way of processing information.

If the human rights community responds by offering only one or two tactics to engage the public, we will appeal only to the narrow constituency to whom those tactics make sense. Legal tactics, for example, are notoriously difficult to use with wide sectors of the population: they tend to be long-term and esoteric efforts in which there is little for anyone beyond a small group of professionals to do. We need to employ other tactics that give more people the chance to be participants rather than observers.

In cultures that have experienced repression, people have learned to withdraw from public life. To engage constituencies in cultures such as these we need to offer tactics that appeal to different risk tolerances and different views of social change.

4 Tactical flexibility is the source of surprise.

As we repeat the same tactics, our adversaries learn to counter them and contain their impact. When we initiated the boycott against Nestlé, the company overreacted and made many mistakes that ended up strengthening the boycott. But as the campaign wore on, Nestlé developed the expertise to smooth over the criticism and implemented effective counteroffensives. We were constantly changing our tactics to throw the company off balance so its counteroffensives would be ineffective.

The fact that human rights continue to be violated underscores the existence of smart, powerful adversaries with substantial resources. One can imagine the power of the first letter-writing campaign from Amnesty International because the tactic was so surprising. But we can also imagine how, after 30 years, most states have learned to bureaucratize a response and protect themselves from the tactic.

Creating surprise keeps the adversary off balance. This can lead to mistakes that undermine its position. It can also lead to learning, as the tactic’s target may gain new insight or come to understand the need for positive change. Inflexibility leads to repetition in our thinking, as well as the adversary’s. Flexibility promotes learning by both parties.

5 Tactics teach participants and observers how to engage in the world.

The first baby food campaign (1975–1985) created a new way of conducting global politics. It was a challenge because each stage of the campaign created new precedents; there was no one to coach us on what to do next. Since then other international campaigns have formed and operated within the same framework and have been able to move much more quickly. Think of the international campaign to ban landmines, which accomplished its goals in 18 months, when INFACT took us nearly ten years.
I think of this phenomenon as something similar to a musician learning a new piece of music. As we practice, the muscles learn how to move, giving the brain the opportunity to plan subtle variations and improvements. As we practice, it gets easier.

Another example comes from Uruguay. For 70 years, a provision of the Uruguayan constitution that allowed a public referendum to overturn parliamentary legislation had never been used. The Uruguayan human rights community dusted off this provision and collected petitions from 25 percent of eligible voters to try to overturn the impunity of those who tortured and killed citizens during the dictatorship. Although the referendum failed by a narrow margin, the Uruguayan population learned a new way of doing politics; the referendum was used eight more times in the next 12 years.

6 Tactics are the training systems for engaging participants and allies in the organization’s work. Some tactics may be short-term (such as a march), some longer-term (such as a boycott). But as systems of acting, all of them require planning, coordination and direction. They create opportunities for many citizens to be involved, to learn and to become more committed to the work of the organization or campaign. Involvement on a tactical level is an excellent training ground for younger or newer staff and volunteers.

When CVT first proposed introducing the Torture Victims Relief Act in the U.S. Congress (a legislative tactic), we used the opportunity to engage other human rights organizations, the religious community and other potential allies. Through their engagement, they became more knowledgeable about the work of torture treatment programs and the experiences of survivors and began to incorporate our understanding of torture into their language.

Tactical innovation is critical to the successful implementation of human rights around the globe. By expanding our thinking both tactically and strategically, the human rights community has the opportunity to be more effective. In summary:

1. A narrow range of tactics leads to narrow constituencies; a broader range of tactics appeals to a wider variety of people and organizations.

2. An over-reliance on any single tactic leads to its application in the wrong circumstances and to missed opportunities to expand strategic targets; flexible tactical thinking creates the opportunity for refined strategic targeting.

3. An overused tactic encourages the adversary to systematize a response and makes it easier for adversaries to defend their position; tactical flexibility creates surprise and learning.

We do not intend this workbook to be a “cookbook” for creating strategies or to promote any particular approach or methodology. It is intended as a resource and a starting point for refining and refining the process of strategy development. The workbook is divided into sections that focus on different aspects of the process.

Tactics and Tactical Thinking

In the past twenty-five years, strategic planning has become the norm in nongovernmental organizations. Curiously, the notion of tactics has not accompanied the development of strategic planning and still remains, for many, a pejorative term. We commonly say something or someone is “tactical” rather than “strategic,” meaning subject to limited, short-term thinking rather than long-term, core thinking. “Tactics” implies maneuvering for short-term gain or position, perhaps in an unethically manner and because it is not often used in the human rights field the word has raised a number of questions. “Isn’t this a military term?” “The word is confusing!” “What do you mean by tactics?” “People in my region don’t use this word.” So, you may ask, why are we using the word “tactic” rather than another word such as approach, methodology or technique?

In the New Tactics in Human Rights Project, we use “tactic” because of its integral relationship to the concept of “strategy.” Strategy defines what is important to do, tactics embody how to do it. The relationship between “the what” and “the how” is important in understanding — and demystifying — the concepts of strategy and tactics. Tactics — which may be activities, systems, techniques or even institutions — are one of the key building blocks of strategy.

Another source of confusion is that a strategy for one group may be a tactic for another. A government, for example, could develop a strategy of creating new institutions for protecting human rights. One of the tactics in this strategy may be creating a national commission on human rights. But as an entity, the commission must define its own strategy and the tactics it will use to implement it more precisely.

Building successful strategies also relies on tactical flexibility and access to a broad range of tactics. As I explain in “The Need for New Tactics” (p. 12), people, organizations and movements that rely too much on a narrow range of tactics may end up using them in the wrong circumstances or may miss opportunities to use other, more appropriate tactics. They may not be able to attract as broad a range of supporters as they would using more diverse tactics. Also, repeatedly using the same tactics allows the targeted adversaries or systems to adapt and change, rendering the tactics themselves less effective.

This book, while by no means exhaustive, is an illustration of the breadth of tactics being used by the international human rights community. It is a testament both to the creativity — often born of necessity — of human rights practitioners and to the power of tactical and strategic thinking.

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www.newtactics.org